DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI MELAKA DALAM NEGERI MELAKA, MALAYSIA
SAMAN PEMULA NO. MA-23CY-2-10/2024
BETWEEN
TERESA KOK SUH SIM PLAINTIFF
AND
DR. MUHAMAD AKMAL BIN SALEH DEFENDANT
BROAD GROUNDS OF DECISION
PROLOGUE
1. The maxim “manners maketh a man” is not a mere adage but a guiding principle of public life. In the realm of politics, the conduct of elected representatives is more than personal demeanour; it is a mirror reflecting the society that empowers them.
2. Political behaviour does not exist in isolation. It is symbiotic with the electorate, embodying both the virtues and what can be perceived
as systemic flaws of the culture from which it arises. We do not live in a perfect society, but what matters more is the strive and quest for perfection that makes us humans.
3. Language occupies a central place in this dynamic. It is not a neutral medium of communication but a powerful instrument of persuasion, identity formation, and regrettably, at times, manipulation.
4. Politicians deploy language strategically to frame issues, shape narratives, and sway public opinion. The choice of words, tone, and rhetoric determines how policies are perceived, debated, and ultimately legitimised.
5. Political parties, in turn, craft slogans and linguistic markers to distinguish themselves from opponents and to consolidate their base. In this way, language becomes the architecture of political identity.
6. The jurisprudence of rhetoric emphasises that it is rhetoric which enables civilized communal life. Properly employed, rhetoric elevates discourse, fosters reasoned persuasion, and sustains democratic engagement.
7. Improperly wielded, it descends into political opportunism or demagoguery, obscuring truth and corroding civic trust. Thus, the ethical use of language is inseparable from the moral obligations of political office.
8. This Court is of the opinion that the conduct and language of politicians are not trivial matters of style but substantive elements of governance. They shape the state and country as much as laws and institutions do. Where civility and integrity in speech prevail, society is strengthened. When they are abandoned, the social fabric is imperilled.
9. As such, the maxim “manners maketh a man” thus finds its fullest expression in the political sphere, reminding us that leadership is measured not only by decisions taken but by the manner in which they are conveyed.
10. Whilst a nation striving towards political and social maturity may well be guided by the intellect and leadership of political figures from both sides, or indeed multiple sides, of the divide—such as the two fine and exemplary individuals who appear herein – to embody and represent such qualities—it is NOT for this Court to decipher the hidden intent or purpose behind the events that transpired.
11. All in all, what this Court had to decide on was on a rather regrettable incident over a matter of public interest, which could have and should have been dealt with in a manner more appropriately. Nevertheless, this Court is bound by law to adjudicate upon what was said, what was the response thereto, and the legal consequences that follow.
12. It is on the basis of the narrative above that I deliver my decision on this defamation suit of the Plaintiff against the Defendant.
Brief Facts
1. The Plaintiff is the Member of Parliament for the constituency of Seputeh in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), having continuously served as an elected MP since 1999.
2. The Defendant, a member of the political party United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is the Head of the UMNO Youth, a Melaka State Executive Council member, and at all material times, is an elected representative to the State Legislative Assembly or Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri for the Malaccan state constituency of Merlimau. He is also a medical doctor by training.
3. On 6 September 2024, the then Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Religious Affairs), Datuk Dr Mohd Naim Mokhtar, announced that the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (Jakim) was studying a proposal to mandate halal certification for eateries that do not serve pork or alcohol, noting that statutory amendments would be required to enforce it.
4. On the same day, the Plaintiff published a Facebook statement critiquing the proposal, citing financial burdens on micro, small, and medium enterprises (PMKS) and stating that mandatory certification could embarrass Malaysia internationally (to quote in verbatim : ‘memalukan negara kita di peringkat antarabangsa’).
5. The Plaintiff subsequently explained that the word ‘memalukan’ resulted from an inaccurate ChatGPT translation from Mandarin to
Bahasa Malaysia. During cross-examination, she acknowledged the word choice was unfortunate, but maintained her underlying intent was strictly to protect small traders.
6. On 7 September 2024, the Defendant recorded and published a video directed at the Plaintiff across the following social media platforms, namely TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram (reaching over 1.7 million followers), containing five impugned statements including
• calling her ‘Nyonya tua’;
• telling her ‘kamu diam lebih elok’;
• asserting she ‘tak habis-habis mengganggu gugat keharmonian negara’; and
• calling to stamp a ‘logo non-halal’ on her forehead.
7. The exact statements are reproduced below:-
i. ‘Saya terbaca hari ini ada Nyonya tua yang menyatakan ini Teresa Kok ini wajibkan sijil halal ini akan tambah beban peniaga dan malukan negara…’
ii. ‘Jadi apa masalah kamu dengan sijil halal ini? Ini kalau kamu tak suka, dia tak melibatkan kamu pun.’
iii. Dan yang sebenarnya memalukan negara ini adalah pada ahli Parliament yang seperti kamu wahai Nyonya tua yang tak habis-habis mengganggu gugat keharmonian negara.’
iv. ‘Kalau kamu tak tahu tentang agama kami, jangan cakap! Kamu diam lebih elok.’
v. Dan saya minta juga pada kerajaan sediakan 1 logo non halal ni tampal kat dahi nyonya tua ni.’
8. After a short yet comprehensive trial held on 30 and 31 July 2026, with 3 witnesses for the Plaintiff and just the Defendant giving his testimony, this Court heard closing post-trial submissions from both counsels on 21 September 2026.
Issues
9. Upon a review of all the pleadings, notes of proceedings and submissions of the parties, the main issues to be determined are as follows:-
i. Issue 1 — Defamatory Meaning and Reference: Whether the five impugned video statements are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and refer directly to the Plaintiff.
ii. Issue 2 — Defence of Fair Comment: Whether the Defendant can establish the defence of Fair Comment under Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957 or at common law.
iii. Issue 3 — Defence of Qualified Privilege: Whether the Defendant can establish the defence of Qualified Privilege at common law or under public interest privilege.
iv. Issue 4 — Express Malice: Whether the Defendant’s publication was actuated by express malice, thereby destroying any affirmative defence.
v. Issue 5 — Quantum and Remedies: What is the appropriate assessment of general and aggravated damages, and what permanent and mandatory injunctive relief should be granted?
Summary Of Witness Testimonies and Evidence
10. 3 witnesses testified on behalf of the Plaintiff, and briefly, their testimonies can be summarised as follows.
11. SP-1 / PW-1 (Vinod a/l Gangatharan — Malaysiakini Senior Subeditor): Subpoenaed witness for the Plaintiff. Identified and verified 12 news articles on Malaysiakini covering the public controversy. Emphasized under re-examination that news reports must be evaluated in their full context rather than piecemeal.
12. SP-2 / PW-2 (Khalid Abdul Samad — Former Cabinet Minister): A former Cabinet Minister testifying for the Plaintiff. Confirmed that the Plaintiff raised a legitimate economic concern regarding small traders. He explained, in his personal view, that the Defendant’s video exceeded policy debate by resorting to personal abuse (‘Nyonya tua’, forehead branding). He admitted that whilst he was not a trained Islamic scholar, as a Muslim, he opined that in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), stamping a person ‘non-halal’ carries derogatory implications of being an enemy of Islam.
13. SP-3 / PW-3 (YB Teresa Kok Suh Sim — Plaintiff): The Plaintiff herself. Detailed her 25-year career as a six-term MP. Explained that her Facebook post was drafted under time constraints using ChatGPT for translation, leading to the word ‘memalukan’. Reaffirmed that her post was purely about public policy and economics, and that the Defendant weaponized the translation error into an alleged attack on Islam.
14. The Defendant, on the other hand, did not call any witnesses but chose to take the witness stand himself. SD-1 / DW-1 (YB Datuk Dr.
Muhamad Akmal Bin Saleh — Defendant) admitted under cross-examination that he recorded the video in anger immediately after reading an excerpt, without seeking clarification. He also admitted that his primary motive was to ‘membidas’ (attack) the Plaintiff personally. Confirming that he possessed full technical capability to delete the video from TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram, but he instead chose to keep it online up to and throughout the trial, offering no apology or retraction.
Analysis Of Evidence And Submissions
15. Defamatory Meaning and Reference: Whether the five impugned video statements are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and refer directly to the Plaintiff. The Court finds that it cannot be disputed that the video carried defamatory imputations against the Plaintiff.
16. In Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong [2024] 5 MLRA 68, the Federal Court reiterated the test in determining what is defamatory.
17. In Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 2 MLRA 345, the Federal Court places the burden of proving upon the Plaintiff that the words refer to the Plaintiff, were defamatory of the Plaintiff and were published.
18. In Lim Lip Eng v. Ong Ka Chuan [2022] 4 MLJ 454, the Federal Court once again reiterated what amounts to defamation, which is essentially a question of fact. At paragraph 23:-
[23] What amounts to defamation or a defamatory statement is a question of fact. It has been explained time and again by our courts. Among the recent decisions is one by this court in Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 577, FC wherein Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal FCJ in para 19 of His Lordship’s judgment had quoted some[2022] 4 MLJ 454 at 468authorities and concluded, inter alia, an imputation would be defamatory if its effect is to expose the plaintiff, in the eyes of the community, to hatred, ridicule or contempt or to lower him or her in their estimation or to cause him or her to be shunned and avoided by them. His Lordship once again in the recent decision of Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514 succinctly reiterated the critical elements of defamation at paras 28 to 30 of the judgment. We endorse those views and in addition cite the helpful comments of K Kuldeep Singh in The Tort of Defamation, Concepts and Cases on Libel and Slander in Malaysia and Singapore (2nd Ed, Lexis Nexis) p 1, para 1.1.1 as follows: The defamation laws in Malaysia and Singapore do not define the term defamation. Instead from key words found in statute and subsequent case laws we can formulate what the term means. The defamation law uses key terms such as ‘Words spoken and published which impute …’, ‘word calculated to disparage the plaintiff, ‘calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff; ‘materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation’. These terms suggest that the plaintiff has been injured or set to be in a loss state in his reputation as a consequence of the defamatory statement. Generally, a person is said to be defamed when a defamatory statement, amounts into a publication, where such a statement is untrue and was calculated to injure his or her reputation and thereby
exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule. The injury that occurs upon the defamed person is known as ‘verbal injury’ to his reputation. The law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others to be unaffected by false statements to his discredit. A key question to be asked is ‘Do the words tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?’ The words should not be regarded as defamatory unless they involve some lowering of the plaintiff’s reputation or of the respect with which he is regarded. They must be disparaging of him. They must ‘injure’ the reputation or is likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally. The standard to be applied when determining if the injury was significant must be done after it is viewed through the eyes and ears of right thinking members of society (otherwise known as the hypothetical reasonable reader).
19. In this Court’s opinion, the said video did carry a severe defamatory sting that the Plaintiff habitually and continually destabilises national harmony. The Defendant’s remarks, as he himself testified that was made in anger, went far beyond policy critique.
20. Fair Comment Rejection: The defence of Fair Comment fails because there is no factual substratum for alleging that the Plaintiff habitually disrupts national harmony (the case of Raja Syahrir Abu Bakar & Anor v Manjeet Singh Dhillon & other appeals [2019] 4 MLRA 218 is referred, particularly to paragraphs 64 to 68 therein, in relation to the defence of fair comment). In this instant case, police reports do not prove the truth of an imputation.
21. A defendant cannot invent or extrapolate unproven facts and comment upon them. Proving neutral administrative background facts about JAKIM’s halal process does not provide a factual foundation for the specific defamatory allegation that the Plaintiff habitually or continuously disturbs national harmony (‘tak habis-habis’).
22. Qualified Privilege Rejection: Qualified Privilege fails due to mass social media dissemination to 1.7M+ followers and the inclusion of gratuitous personal abuse. Broadcasting an aggressive video across three open social media platforms to over 1.7 million followers destroys any restricted privileged occasion. Moreover, gratuitous personal denunciation constitutes extraneous matter that forfeits privilege.
23. In S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 1 MLRA 110, the Supreme Court at paragraph 22 of its judgment opined:-
“The protection afforded by the law to a publication made on an occasion of qualified privilege is not an absolute protection but depends on the honesty of purpose of the person who makes the publication. If he uses the occasion for some other purpose than that for which the law gives protection, he will not be able to rely on the privilege. If the publication takes place under circumstances which created a qualified privilege, in order to succeed the Plaintiff has to prove express malice on the part of the defendant. Broadly speaking express malice means malice in the popular sense of or a desire to injure the person who is defamed. To destroy the privilege, the desire to injure must be the dominant motive for the defamatory publication.”
24. This Court will proceed to discuss what is express malice: Express malice is proven on five objective pillars, destroying both affirmative defences. Having reviewed the witness statements and notes of proceedings, this Court has arrived at the following conclusions:-
i. There was pre-publication anger; which the Defendant himself testified on several occasions that he was indeed “marah” with the Plaintiff that moved him to make the said video;
ii. admitted motive to ‘membidas’ (attack) personally
iii. use of inflammatory religious tropes (‘Nyonya tua’, forehead branding with non-halal);
iv. persistent online dissemination, and v. total refusal to apologize or retract.
These completely destroy both Fair Comment and Qualified Privilege defences.
25. Based on the above, it is therefore this Court’s view that the first four issues have been answered in favour of the Plaintiff. What now remains is this Court’s decision on the quantum of damages and remedies.
Quantum of Damages and Relief
26. It is trite that under Malaysian law, libel is actionable per se, meaning damage to reputation is presumed by law without requiring the plaintiff to prove specific pecuniary or financial loss. Nevertheless, in assessing damages, this Court conducted a detailed evidential evaluation of the injury to reputation, the conduct of the parties, and the governing judicial benchmarks.
27. In an action for libel, damage is presumed by law. During cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized that the Plaintiff did not produce objective approval polling ratings or medical records to quantify her distress. This Court holds that opinion polling or medical evidence is not a legal prerequisite for general damages in libel. Reputation is an intangible asset, and compensation is assessed objectively from the gravity of the libel, the standing of the plaintiff, and the scale of publication.
28. The Defendant submitted that damages should be reduced to a nominal sum because the Plaintiff instigated the controversy through her Facebook post and ChatGPT translation lapse (‘memalukan’), sparking 50 police reports. This Court firmly rejects this contention:
i. Policy Critique is Not Legal Provocation: Raising public policy concerns regarding commercial burdens on small traders (PMKS) is legitimate democratic engagement. A public official exercising her duties does not commit legal provocation or act with ‘dirty hands’.
ii. Absence of Mutual Mudslinging: For a dispute to be classified as a mutual ‘brawl’ or ‘mudslinging’ that reduces damages to nominal tokens, both parties must have traded personal insults. The Plaintiff’s post was strictly confined to policy; the Defendant unilaterally escalated the matter into a personal character attack.
iii. Translation Error is Not a Licence to Defame: An imperfect translation or unfortunate word choice by an elected official is not a licence for an opponent to execute an unevidenced character assassination.
Aggravating Evidential Factors
29. Far from finding mitigating factors, the Court finds the Defendant’s conduct severely aggravated the injury:
1. Massive Dissemination: Broadcasted across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram to over 1.7 million followers.
2. High-Handed Persistence: The Defendant admitted he had full technical control to delete the video but intentionally kept it online up to trial.
3. Absence of Remorse: Refused to apologize, issuing no retraction following a Notice of Demand, and holding a press conference reiterating his position.
Comparative Precedents and synthesis
30. The Court synthesizes recent binding benchmarks involving the same Plaintiff and other public figures, particularly one involving the current Plaintiff herself in Tan Sri Lim Kit Sing v YB Dr Siti Mastura bt Muhammad and other suits [2024] MLJU 3687.
31. This Court adopts a single global award combining general and aggravated damages.
32. Taking into account her 25-year standing as a six-term MP, the gravity of accusing her of habitually endangering national harmony, and the Defendant’s persistent refusal to retract, having to regard to the entire circumstances and totality of evidence, a global sum of RM250,000.00 is fair, reasonable, and proportionate.
Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment on Liability: Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff against the Defendant on liability.
2. Global Damages: The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the global sum of RM250,000.00 in general and aggravated damages.
3. Permanent Injunction: A permanent injunction is granted restraining the Defendant, whether by himself, his agents, servants, or representatives, from publishing, republishing, or broadcasting the impugned defamatory words or words to the same effect.
4. Mandatory Removal Injunction: A mandatory injunction is granted ordering the Defendant to forthwith, and in any event within seven
(7) days from the date of this order, remove and delete the impugned video from all his social media accounts (including but not limited to TikTok, Facebook, Instagram).
5. Costs: The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff costs of RM50,000.00, subject to the allocatur fee.
DATED : 19 OCTOBER 2026
Datuk Isa Aziz Ibrahim
Judicial Commissioner Malacca
High Court 2